Another potential pitfall in Dr. Murphy's theory comes in the form of the issue of arbitration:

15) The principles behind this statement are essentially correct; laws are scraps of paper without proper enforcement and an intellectual spirit conducive to their efficacy. However, under market anarchy, there is no single definite system of courts nor is there a hierarchy of appeals courts. Let us presume that two disputing individuals, A and B, have agreed to settle their case via Arbiter C. Arbiter C settles the dispute in favor of A, but B is not content. He appeals the case to Arbiter D, who rules in favor of B. Both C and D are of about equal reputation and stature; they just disagree over a complex matter. Furthermore, A and B, seeking to resolve this dispute, appeal to a multiplicity of high-profile private arbiters who are sharply divided on the issue. If none of these arbiters has positional superiority over any other, whose ruling should be carried out? Furthermore, what would prevent appeals ad infinitum by every dissatisfied party (especially an extremely wealthy dissatisfied party with the capacity to file such prolonged appeals)? Arbitration on a free market is often an effective means of conflict resolution; private businesses have had elaborate systems of market arbitration for centuries. However, in the event of an irreconcilable dispute, I am inclined to believe that there should always be a final court of appeal, i.e., the Supreme Court, which would have the power to issue an ultimate ruling and close an extremely volatile and contentious case.

16) Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that a single hierarchy of judges or an ultimate court of appeal will emerge on the free market. People will always disagree about who is the most skilled, competent, and authoritative judge, if recent opinion divisions in the United States on such matters are any indicator. It is even likely that multiple competing hierarchies would emerge, each sharply differing from the other in terms of fundamental legal principles and practices, in which case the potential of individuals dissatisfied with one hierarchy pushing a favorable appeal through the other is immense. How would those cases be resolved without a massive "judicial power struggle"?

          Furthermore, Dr. Murphy's theory acknowledges an absence of rigidly defined a priori legal structure:

17) Are not market forces themselves contingent on valid law, public or private, and its stringent enforcement, for survival? Countries where prosperous free markets emerged have almost always been based either on a firmly entrenched centuries-old British legal tradition (which proved successful even in East Asian territories like Singapore and Hong Kong) or on policies inspired by the Austrian School of Economics (as in pre-World War I Austria-Hungary, Ludwig Erhard's West Germany of the 1950s, and Eastern European countries today). In the absence of principled, theoretically-based law, will not a society more resemble the tribal chaos of Somalia (or most of the rest of Africa, for that matter) and simply revert to a Hobbesian state of nature? If theoretically based law is indeed necessary for functional markets, who will introduce this law into a society and who will make certain that it is adhered to?

          Market anarchy might even pose a threat to the individual's privacy, however paradoxical this might seem at first glance:

18) This poses an immense privacy concern and a loophole that could be expanded into areas beyond who owns what weapons (revealing which information might not, in itself, be of interest to a given individual). But the weapons example might suffice here. It seems that the following chain of reasoning could be derived from the above passage. Insurance company protection is required for survival under market anarchy (we will grant this premise for the time being). But the insurance company demands information about what types of weapons one owns. Giving away this information might intrude on one's privacy. Then, by implication, is a disregard for one's privacy necessary for survival under market anarchy? Furthermore, the disregard for privacy might extend to areas other than weapons ownership. Perhaps a given insurance company might come to be interested in whether Person X stockpiles hundreds of radical political flyers in his basement, since political radicals are more likely to be assaulted or even assassinated by angry fanatics. If Person X used to engage in fights in elementary school, would the insurance company want to know his childhood school record to monitor for "violent tendencies" which might lead to higher payouts by said company? What about the most dangerous privacy violation of them all: required psychological testing for said "violent tendencies"? How would market anarchy contain mechanisms to safeguard against the ubiquitous emergence of such demands as prerequisites for individuals receiving that all-important insurance policy?

          Furthermore, Dr. Murphy contends that, under market anarchy, "community norms" might also have an even greater role to play in the treatment of an individual accused of crime:

19) I have a far more pessimistic interpretation of this tendency: it is a potential for people genuinely innocent of crime to be maligned and mistreated if public opinion is opposed to them. Consider, for example, an individual like O.J. Simpson, hated by the majority and presumed guilty of murder, even though the courts failed to find evidence to convict him. Why should Simpson and those in similar positions continue to be placed at an inherent legal disadvantage despite their probable innocence when objective criteria of judgment (as opposed to majoritarian ones) are employed? Furthermore, the case of the simply unpopular individual can be brought up. Let us return to the example of Person X, who is ostracized by a community of socialists. These socialists keep filing unjustified lawsuits against Person X, although Person X is acquitted every time. Would Person X's premiums increase simply because he is forced to be a defendant such a high number of times, thus increasing his probability of being convicted on any given occasion? How can it be considered justice for those objectively innocent of breaking the law to receive potentially the same treatment as those convicted of violations?

          Dr. Murphy's second essay, Private Defense, concerns the provision of market protections against external aggression (initiated presumably by dictatorships or welfare states, since anarcho-capitalist societies are claimed not to engage in military expansionism).

          Dr. Murphy suggests a mechanism by which such private defense could be accomplished:

20) Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that these insurance companies would have a financial incentive to fight a protracted war of defense where both sides still have considerable resources at stake. However, if the enemy were to launch a surprise attack, quickly destroying much of an anarcho-capitalist society's infrastructure, the insurance companies would already have enormous expenses to pay. What would be their motivation to accrue additional expenses by providing further defense and continuing the fight? What would prevent them from surrendering to the enemy, signing some manner of deal permitting the continuation of their existence under the framework of the invading government, and avoiding payment of further damages?

          On p. 42, Dr. Murphy suggests a mechanism whereby insurance companies would have increased incentives to actually provide defense services to their customers and thus lessen the possibility that an invader will damage their customers' property and bring about the need for the insurance companies to pay out damages. However, this leads to further questions:

21) Let us presume that a neighbor of the anarcho-capitalist society is a dictator analogous to Saddam Hussein, who has repeatedly shown himself to be prone to aggression, yet who has never invaded the anarcho-capitalist society. The insurance companies' analysts predict that the cost of invading the neighboring State and displacing the dictator would be lower than the costs to be incurred in the event that said dictator were to invade. Would market anarchy be able to facilitate pre-emptive strikes against territories with a State? Would neighboring states be sufficiently deterred by the threat of such a pre-emptive strike as to behave in a manner conciliatory to the anarcho-capitalist society?

22) Granting that the free market will eventually develop defensive armies (and likely superior ones to government armies, as mercenary forces and private contractors have shown time and again throughout history), the rate at which such forces emerge is also a point of contention. The growth of services on a free market is almost always evolutionary and gradual, which, in the long term, would lead to services that have stood the test of time. However, what of the short term? How can a freshly emerging anarcho-capitalist society address the threat of dictatorial or welfare states on its borders, posing a military threat now, before competition can yield the optimal retaliatory capacities?

23) Would it not be superior to a complete anarchy in terms of the military to have private competition be fostered within the parameters of a single government? Consider the American government's current use of multiple competing airplane and tank designers in order to obtain the best available weapons technologies, or its use of private contractors in Iraq. Might it be possible for governments to simply deregulate the military further and render it entirely dependent on mercenaries, contractors, and competing insurance companies while still maintaining that only the government has the authority to either hire these entities to undertake military activities or to simply issue permits for these entities to carry out military actions within a strictly defined and limited scope? In this manner, a society might reap the benefits of both market competition and a restraining hand on the military's activities in the form of an ultimate authority on said activities. (The market would, in that case, set prices, by the way, in accord with actual supply and demand, thus addressing Dr. Murphy's contention that a government monopoly on services inherently disregards their actual worth.)

          While a government is theoretically obliged to protect everybody within its jurisdiction, under market anarchy this is not the case. Dr. Murphy comments on markets overcoming the "free rider" problem in defense (i. e. the problem of people who have not paid for the service receiving it nonetheless):

24) If large entities were to provide far more money to insurance firms than private individuals, would not the incentive to protect said individuals (who require protection the most, given the lack of resources and economies of scale to coordinate it themselves) on the part of the insurance companies be markedly reduced? If so, how would those individuals attain a sufficient degree of safety against foreign aggression (especially if the insurance policies they do have discourage them from owning too many or too powerful weapons, as Dr. Murphy contended earlier)?

25) This is my principal objection to wholly private defense: Does not every individual, regardless of ability to pay, have a natural right to life, liberty, and property, implying that nobody should be able to kill him, enslave him, or deprive him of what little he owns with impunity? Is it not the right of every individual to receive protection against the initiation of force? In the absence of a government with the obligation to provide this protection to everybody, how can this right be honored?

          Dr. Murphy then presents an example of how the Battle of Stalingrad could have been fought under market anarchy:

26) This presumes, of course, that all of these individuals would have a compelling self-interest to resist the invaders (especially if they are staunch ideological supporters of free markets, concerned about intrusions upon their liberties). Some individuals are thus principled, and I grant that they would mount such a resistance. But what about men who are not of this sort and choose to join the invader, or insurance companies who see it as more profitable to do so? Rather than forming coordinated resistance from scratch, would it not be easier for these entities to aid the enemy and work out arrangements for either more lenient treatment or even certain perks once the invading government takes over? Under a government resisting an invasion, deserters to the enemy are found guilty of treason and usually executed, a powerful deterrent against assisting the invader. Would a comparable deterrent exist under market anarchy? If so, what form would it take? If not, how would traitors and collaborators with the enemy be punished?

          Dr. Murphy also comments on certain norms of conduct that would emerge under private defense. On p. 51, he suggests that these norms will lead to "prohibitions on wiretaps and torture," for example.

27) How would prohibitions on wiretaps be enforced, especially if, as Dr. Murphy claims, "counterintelligence would probably be quite limited"? Let us presume that Firm A has developed a sufficiently advanced wiretapping capacity as to be slightly ahead of the competition. If it successfully wiretapped competing firms or foreign governments, it would not be detected. Even if there were a theoretical capacity to detect the espionage, limited counterintelligence tendencies would prevent it from being fully employed. Thus, what barriers would exist to prevent Firm A from just wiretapping everybody with impunity (or conducting other intrusive surveillance)? The case of market anarchy seems remarkably reminiscent of the modern situation, wherein millions of people carry cellular communication devices with built-in cameras and scant guarantees against their ability to take pictures of any stranger they please, anywhere, at any time.

          Dr. Murphy also claims that the threat to anarchist societies from nearby states would be minimal:

28) If the very existence of a successful anarchist society repudiates by example the necessity of a State, as anarchists would need to claim for their model to be valid, would not states, on the contrary, be extremely wary of such societies? If governments in power seek to stay in power, would they also not seek to forcefully address such blatant threats to their existence (even though the residents of the free territories might not intentionally be threatening anyone)?

29) What would prevent governments from allowing the anarchist society to develop for some time, until it amassed vast prosperity, and then, under the modus operandi of so many historical parasites, threatening the anarchist society or attempting to invade it and annex its territory, so as to receive a temporary boost to the invaders' consumption of the goods that the anarchist society had produced?

30) Dr. Murphy's argument places him in a double bind. Either a) the anarchist society is completely unwilling to undertake pre-emptive strikes and is thus vulnerable to dictators developing their aggressive capacities to the point where successful invasion of the anarchist society is possible or b) the anarchist society is willing to engage in pre-emptive strikes against states its citizens view as a threat, in which case said states would not have the sort of friendly relations with the anarchist society that Dr. Murphy describes, and would rather have incentives to oppose such a society or at least to always be on their guard. In either case, a conspicuous military threat to the existence of the anarchist society would exist.

          There are further issues that Dr. Murphy's general thesis causes to arise:

31) What if a given insurance company (especially a large, international one) has two bodies of clients that decide to go to war against each other? How would the insurance company resolve the conflict? What standards would be used to determine liability and which party gets assistance? Would not denying the other party
(presumably the one held liable for the violence) assistance be a violation of contract (presuming that the original contract specified that the insurance company would grant any of its clients assistance in the event of war)?

32) War itself is a breakdown of the market and of the trader principle. The free market is based on the premise of the non-initiation of force and voluntary consent of all individuals in the disposal of their lives and property. In war, initiation of force on one or both sides is inherently present. How can a free market, then, suffice to address a situation inherently outside its own basic premise?

33) As an extension to #32, a minarchist would claim that the government ought to allow the free market to provide all goods whose acquisition is entirely consensual. However, the use of force, be it in initiation or in retaliation, is not consensual by definition, from the perspective of at least one of the parties involved. While in the market for all other goods, each individual gets to "vote" with his dollar as to how the market will get to benefit him, while acting to the detriment of nobody else, on the market for force-based goods and services, each dollar an individual "votes" with is a "vote" against somebody else, whether that person be deserving of such a "vote" or not. Should not such "votes" be cast only by agencies that take just desert, as established by objective criteria of Reason, into utmost consideration?

          It cannot be too frequently expressed that I fully concur with Dr. Murphy in the vast portion of his analysis concerning the deficiencies of every government system up to our time. I also fully concur with his desire for a radical alteration of the political status quo, and a radical reduction in the role of government in individuals' lives. However, I am far from certain that an altogether elimination of government will be wholly devoid of problems, especially since it easily permits the collective to be substituted for the objective. As a means of maintaining objectivity in law and defense, I have suggested tempering and balancing the branches of government dependent on the rule of the majority with those wholly independent from majoritarian paradigms and interests.

          In "The Fundamentals of Laissez-Faire Meritocracy" and "Post-Veto Authority," I have proposed a model of government dramatically differing from anything in existence up to this day, wherein non-majoritarian branches of government would not have the power to promulgate positive laws, but would be able to undo the damage perpetrated by intrusive majority-approved legislation via the use of unconditional and non-expiring authority to repeal interventionist laws. In further treatises, I plan to expand on my proposal for an "investmentocracy," which structures political votes in a government much like shares of a corporation and avoids the pitfalls of majority rule associated with the "one man, one vote" premise.

          There are numerous clear advantages to the involvement of private agencies in providing law and defense, which is the reason why Dr. Murphy's theory is credible, scholarly work, far more formidable than current "mainstream" political thought. The task for future political theorists, however, is to address the concerns about Dr. Murphy's system that I have raised while maintaining its evident advantages.